Verify before a single token is sent. Client-side enclave verification — this page checks the hardware, the firmware and the measurements in your browser. No Complear server takes part in the check.
Live enclave verification
A nonce is generated in this tab, sent to the enclave, and must come back bound inside a fresh hardware quote chained to Intel's root of trust. Stale or replayed evidence fails.
What the hardware reported
What gets checked
Fresh evidence, made for this session. The quote is produced now, for your browser, on a nonce generated in this tab. Replayed quotes fail.
Real Intel TDX silicon. The quote's certificate chain verifies to the pinned Intel root inside the WASM verifier. A simulator or another TEE type cannot pass.
Debug rejected, TCB appraised. Debug-enabled TDs fail; the TCB level is checked against Intel's published collateral, fetched live from Intel.
Measurements shown, not just a green tick. Launch measurement (MRTD) and runtime registers (RTMR0–3) are displayed so they can be compared against the audited image manifest.
Fail-closed. If the enclave is unreachable, the verifier errors, or anything does not check out — you see red or a closed state. Never a cached verdict.
What this does not prove
Verification proves which code and firmware run — it does not prove that code is benign. The measurement is the contract: compare it to the audited image.
Revocation collateral is not checked in this browser view; it is checked by the full release verifier with the complete evidence bundle.
An endorsement (e.g. a cloud firmware endorsement) proves firmware provenance, not the identity of the operator. Operator identity is bound by the key-release policy.